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Abstract: The aim of this paper is analyze the impact of irregular receipts (one-time receipts such as 
dividends from public companies and privatization proceeds) in budget deficits that are partially 
financed by public debt (internal and external) in Kosovo. Kosovo is experiencing both a budget deficit 
and public debt burden, so it is important to analyze the very beginnings of these tendencies. There is 
extensive literature on the causes of a budget deficit, its definition and measurement. The literature 
review method is adopted for this study, and research is refined by including empirical and theoretical 
studies of budget deficits and public debts. Using this line of reasoning, we have defined and measured 
special-purpose deficits, so-called “regular” budget deficits that consider only regular receipts and 
outlays. This analysis leads to the conclusion that irregular receipts used by government to engage in 
large infrastructure projects and/or politically motivated increases of wage and salary bills and social 
transfers created future liabilities that had to be financed through public debt. This is a case study of 
Kosovo. Research has been carried out using primary data drawn from Kosovo’s annual financial 
reports and annual bulletins on public debt. Budget deficits in Kosovo are results of continuous outlays 
based on initially high cash balances and irregular receipts that could not be met later by regular 
receipts. All this was supported by lack of legal infrastructure or fiscal rules for several years. The 
implications of this paper will be of high importance for policy-makers and academics. This is a unique 
approach to the issues of Kosovo's budget deficit and debt. 
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1. Introduction 
Kosovo’s debt history is as young as the country. The new country started with a 
cash balance of 449.8 million euros (balance on 1 January 2008) equal to 13% of its 
GDP, with a real GDP growth rate of 8.3% (2007) and no public debt. Another 
406.25 million euros have been added to the privatization fund of Kosovo Trust 
Agency and 279.6 million euros to the Kosovo Pension Saving Trust, and until then, 
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no dividend was received by the government from public companies. Thus, cash 
amounting to about 30% of GDP was idle on the eve of Kosovo independence, while 
the unemployment rate was estimated to be around 40% and very bad public 
infrastructure (mainly roads) was considered one of the most serious obstacles to 
economic growth. Kosovo chronically suffers from large trade deficits, with around 
10% of exports covering imports while the balance of deficit payments are being 
covered by FDI and remittances. There have been about 75,000 civil servants, both 
in central and local governments, with the lowest average monthly salary in the 
region of only 230 euros. 
Kosovo's debt portfolio was established in 2009 following membership in the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and and World Bank (WB) on 29 June 2009, 
when the country agreed to take over the debt inherited from the former Yugoslavia 
in the amount of 381.21 million euros as Kosovo Consolidated Credit (KCC) that 
was split into three installments. To finance budget deficit, Kosovo started issuing 
three-month treasury bills in 2012. This step was taken only after the country faced 
liquidity difficulties as a result of continuously running budget deficits since 
independence and almost depletion of its cash balances.  
Table 1. Total debt (million of EUR)  
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
External debt 249.0 260.4 253.6 336.6 323.8 326.4 371.2 373.8 
Internal debt – – – 73.3 152.5 256.5 377.8 480.0 
Total debt 249.0 260.4 253.6 409.9 476.3 582.9 749.0 852.8 
State guarantees – – – – – 10.0 10.0 20.0 
Total* Debt / GDP 6.1 5.9 5.3 8.1 8.9 10.7 13.1 14.6 
GDP 4,070 4,402 4,815 5,059 5,327 5,567 5,807 5,985 
* Source: Yearly Bulletin 2016 on Public Debt, Government of Kosovo, Ministry of Finance 
Including state guarantees 
In fact, Kosovo first borrowed externally in 2010 from IMF. From 2011 onward, 
Kosovo started to borrow from other international financial institutions like 
International Development Association, Unicredit, Kfw, EBRD, and EIB for 
specific projects in education, agriculture, health care, road and rail infrastructure, 
waste and water treatment, central heating, etc. These loans are made regardless of 
developments in the fiscal sector. The government regularly serviced the external 
debt. 
At first glance, there seems to be no concern about internal public debt. The total 
debt ratio to GDP is low (14.6%), while internal debt makes up more than half of it. 
Table 2 shows that Kosovo started to borrow internally in 2012, when according to 
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the government’s annual financial statements, the cash balance at year end was 
ample and the budget recorded a surplus. However, looking more closely, we notice 
that the government was not able to service any principal of the internal debt but 
only the interest, although it continued to run small deficits in 2013-2014 followed 
by surpluses in 2015-2016. The government refinanced the internal debt by 
extending the maturity of newly issued treasury bills. The short-term treasury bills 
(three-month and six-month) were gradually replaced by treasury bills with a 
maturity of 12 months and two years and later with bonds with three-year and five-
year maturity. Neither the annual financial statements nor audit reports show any 
specific reason for increasing public debt. At the same time, there was no deficit 
rule to follow.  
Table 2. Internal public debt (millions of EUR) 
 
Source: Yearly Bulletin 2016 on Public Debt, Ministry of Finance 
On the fiscal side, the figures did not arouse concern (Table 3). Both total receipts 
and total outlays showed remarkable increases with low budget deficits, measured 
as the difference between total receipts and total outlays, while cash balances at year 
end could be considered acceptable. There were no signs of budget constraints even 
though the government engaged in large infrastructure projects, increased wage and 
salary bills and social transfers. 
Table 3. Receipts, outlays, deficit/surplus and cash balances (millions of EUR) 
 
Source: Budget Annual Financial Reports for 2006-2016, Ministry of Finance 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Debt stock 73,31  152,51 256,52 377,78 478,97 
New debt issues 73,31  79,20  104,01 121,26 101,19 
Service of interest 0,66    1,19    2,50    5,50    7,91    
Service of principal -     -     -     -     -     
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Receipts 738 915 989 1.161 1.195 1.313 1.551 1.445 1.463 1.707 1.778 
Outlays 657 676 963 1.252 1.288 1.400 1.476 1.512 1.511 1.614 1.763 
Deficit/surplus 81   239 26   92-     93-     87-     75     66-     48-     93     15     
Cash Balance 211 450 476 384   291   204   278   212   164   257   271   
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Chart 1. Receipts, outlays, deficit/surplus and cash balances 
To gain a better view of the causes of permanently increasing internal public debt, 
we will read differently the data in the annual financial reports, including audit 
reports of these statements made by Kosovo National Audit Office and legal 
infrastructure related to management and accountability of public finances. We will 
show that in 2012, the government ran the highest yearly budget deficit since 
independence and faced the risk of being insolvent as a result of accumulated budget 
deficits since 2008. Among four ways of financing the public sector deficit—
printing money, running down foreign exchange reserves, borrowing abroad and 
borrowing domestically (Fischer & Easterly, 1990)—the only solution for Kosovo’s 
government was to borrow domestically, which in turn is likely to inhibit growth, 
as Adam and Bevan (2005) have pointed out. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Measurement and definition of fiscal deficit are the starting points to analysing its 
causes, impact and financing. Leaving aside theoritical debates of three schools of 
thought concerning the economic effects of budget deficits (neoclassical, 
Keynesian, and Ricardian (Bernheim, 1898), there are numerous definitions and 
measures based on the purpose of the analyses. Furthermore, in addition to the 
economic determinants of budget deficits, political and institutional determinants 
should also be taken into consideration in the analysis (Barisik & Baris, 2017), as 
well as limitations of government borrowing. (Hamilton & Flavin, 1986) As Jacobs 
et al. (2002) point out, each definition highlights a particular aspect of fiscal 
exposure and can serve a valuable purpose from the viewpoints of investors and 
policy analysts. The idea is to use a set of different definitions of the deficit to get 
the full picture of the country's fiscal stance. The determining factor is whether fiscal 
policy is sustainable in the longer term. This is also in line with Fay and Porter 
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(2006), who state that calculations on fiscal imbalance and government 
indebtedness vary depending on which assets, revenues and liabilities are included 
and how they are valued. The most challenging is Kotlikoff (1986), who states that 
the deficit is an inherently arbitrary accounting construct that provides no real guide 
to fiscal policy since the official labeling of something as an asset or a liability is an 
arbitrary choice that has no general basis in economic theory. However, as Jacobs 
et al. (2002) state, a comparison between the different definitions of the budget 
deficit indicated that they do not differ that much in magnitude. In the end, the 
budget balance is a matter of interpretation and management of fiscal policy. There 
is no single superior measure of the budget balance, but rather a set of different 
budget balances measurements, each applicable to specific conditions.  
The simplest definition of budget deficit, according to Irwin (2015), could be the 
difference betwen spending and revenues, without reference to the government's 
balance sheet. If defined in terms of changes in the balance sheet, it is measured as 
the decline in the value of the government’s net assets, which is said to be clean, 
while one that excludes these changes is said to be dirty. A clean deficit is usefully 
split into a part arising from transactions, which gets most attention, and a part 
related to “other economic flows”. Furthermore, different measures of the clean 
deficit arise from differences in the assets and liabilities that are recognized in the 
government's accounting. Within four nested sets of assets and liabilities, the 
smallest set contains cash and nothing else1. A clean cash deficit is just the change 
in the government’s cash balance, which is crucial when the government’s liquidity 
is in doubt, but not very informative otherwise. When cash accounting is used, 
attention is paid to a dirty deficit derived by classifying transactions into groups. 
Often, financing cash flows are distinguished from operating and investing cash 
flows, and the deficit is taken to be the sum of operating and investing cash flows, 
which applies to Kosovo. Blejer and Cheasty (1991) view the conventional public 
sector deficit as a summary of government transactions during a single budget 
period—usually one year—without attention to their longer run implications. This 
deficit requires financing from the government’s “ordinary income” rather than 
from borrowing. However, most widely used is the public sector borrowing 
requirement (PSBR). Fay and Porter (2006) define standardized or cyclically 
adjusted budget deficit or surplus, which corrects for the business cycle effect on 
revenue and outlays (and some other transitory items); a primary deficit that nets 
out interest costs of servicing accumulated debt; and an operating budget that 
separates out public capital investment, net of depreciation. 
                                                             
1 Irwin (2015) identified four nested sets of assets and liabilities, each of which generates its own 
measure of net assets and hence its own clean deficit. Each set also tends to be associated with certain 
dirty deficits, as well as certain measures of the debt. These are: cash (C); C and other financial assets 
(F); F and real assets (R); and R assets and liabilities with respect to all the government's projected 
spending and revenue under current policy (M). 
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When it comes to measuring, Meltzer (1992) points out that primary budget deficit 
—the deficit net of interest payments—is the most relevant measure for the 
economy. Interest payments are excluded because they are a pure transfer without 
economic effect. Thus, the standard measure of the deficit is a cash flow measure of 
the amount that the government has to finance currently. Jacobs et al. (2002) 
consider that conventional budget balance is not a sufficiently correct indicator to 
measure the stance of fiscal policy. Along with conventional budget balance that 
could be measured on a cash or an accrual basis, they analyze an additional 14 
balance measures or other fiscal indicators. Also, Blejer and Cheasty (1991) state 
that conventional measures of the fiscal deficit miscalculate the public sector’s true 
budget constraint and give a misleading picture of the economy’s fiscal stance, 
which is why the budget should be viewed from several angles. Fiscal deficit 
measures must be specified over three dimensions: 1) the deficit has to be defined 
for a public sector of a given coverage, 2) the coverage, or size, of the public sector 
and its composition must be delineated, and 3) the relevant time horizon for 
assessing the magnitude of the deficit must be identified. To highlight the 
differential impact of various budgetary transactions (such as investment, import 
purchase or debt service) on important macroeconomic variables (such as savings, 
the balance of payments and inflation), policy-makers calculate alternative 
measures of the deficit, a so-called special-purpose deficit (the current deficit; the 
deficit measuring the contribution of different transactions to aggregate demand; the 
domestic deficit; structural and cyclically adjusted deficit and operational deficit). 
According to Eisner and Pieper (1985) and Eisner (1989), a measure of the real, 
actual surplus or deficit can be viewed as essentially the sum of three components: 
1) the nominal surplus or deficit as currently measured; 2) an adjustment for changes 
in market value of government financial assets and liabilities due to changing market 
rates of interest (interest effects); and 3) changes in the real value of net debt due to 
changing general price levels incident to inflation (price effects). An identical or 
analogous set of adjustments is appropriate for the high employment budget surplus 
or deficit. Also, Milesi-Ferreti (1996) point out that the nominal budget deficit 
(inclusive of interest payments) may be a flawed measure of the actual fiscal stance 
for several reasons. First, it does not take into account the effects of inflation on 
interest payments, therefore counting anticipated debt repayment as deficit. Second, 
in the presence of economic growth, the debt to GDP ratio can be kept constant even 
if the country is running a budget deficit. Third, seigniorage revenues are not 
included. Fourth, conventional measures of the fiscal deficit do not correspond to 
changes of the government’s net worth: this implies that privatization proceeds 
always improve the government's fiscal position by reducing public debt, because 
the decline in public sector assets is ignored. Finally, contingent liabilities are not 
explicitly accounted for in the budget. Since the deficit is defined as an arbitrary 
accounting construct, Kotlikoff (1986) treats government simply as an institution 
that takes receipts and makes payments, finding nothing to learn about the 
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underlying economy considering only the size of reported debt. He recommends 
examining directly the lifetime budget constraints of different generations and 
asking whether government policies have expanded the lifetime consumption 
opportunities of older generations at the price of reduced lifetime consumption 
opportunities of younger and future generations. 
In principle, the budget is always and everywhere politically influenced and thus 
makes the fiscal policy another source of uncertainty. As a consequence, as Fukač 
and Kirkby (2017) state, expenditures and revenues are subject to random surprises 
that are unrelated to economic developments. However, the scope of political 
influence depends on institutional strength. As Shi and Svensson (2006) point out, 
the strong institutional constraints on politicians in developed countries leave little 
room for public officials to expropriate public resources for private gains, and the 
large share of informed voters in these countries renders fiscal policy manipulations 
less effective. But according to Koszan (2005), the discretionary component appears 
to be larger for the Western Balkans, where less of the variation in spending is 
explained by cyclical factors and inertia. Milesi-Ferreti (1996) develops a model 
based on “fiscal illusion” with opportunistic policy-makers and naive voters. The 
policy-makers are opportunistic (they care about electoral prospects and not directly 
about private agents’ welfare) and use fiscal deficits to increase their electoral 
chances. Voters overestimate the benefit of current expenditure and/or 
underestimate future tax burdens and therefore do not “punish” politicians for 
fiscally irresponsible behavior. In the situations of political polarization (mainly 
reflected in spending priorities between political parties) and electoral uncertainty, 
there is a tendency for increasing debt, that is, increasing budget deficits, to 
constrain policy choices of future governments. Alesina and Peroti (1994) share this 
view, stating that in a nutshell, the idea of fiscal illusion is that the voters do not 
understand the intertemporal budget constraints of the government. Opportunistic 
politicians who want to be reelected take advantage of this confusion by raising 
spending more than taxes to please the “fiscally illuded” voters. Thus, as a result of 
political influence, Shi and Svensson (2006) confirm that on average, government 
deficits as shares of GDP increase by almost one percentage point in election years, 
or on average, the fiscal deficit increases by 22% in election years.  
To avoid as much as possible the political motivation of budget deficits, fiscal rules 
are considered one of the solutions, being designed to constrain fiscal policy. 
(Grembi et al., 2016) Fiscal rules have become an important institutional 
requirement for many countries in balancing their budgets. (Luechinger & 
Schaltegger, 2013) Even more, fiscal rules are introduced to increase confidence in 
fiscal policy, lower costs of public borrowing and ensure the sustainability of public 
debt. (Badinger & Reuter, 2017) According to Poterba (1996), budget rules provide 
a form of self control for political actors, while Gronex (2009) defines budget rules 
as a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, typically defined in terms of an indicator 
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of overall fiscal performance. As a result, fiscal rules are usually differentiated by 
the type of fiscal indicator that they target, with the budget balance rules being most 
common, followed by debt rules, expenditure rules, and, far behind, revenue rules. 
(Guerguil et al., 2017) In general, there are two most used rules: the fixed deficit 
rule and the capital borrowing rule, often called a “golden rule.” The fixed deficit 
rule allows public consumption to be financed by deficits, whereas the golden rule 
allows the government only to run deficits if they are used to finance investments in 
the public capital stock. Analyzing growth and welfare effects of budget rules, 
Gronex (2009) points out that the crucial difference between the two rules is the 
development of the growth rate of public investment. The golden rule leads to an 
immediate jump in the rate of growth of public capital and also a higher growth rate 
in the long run. Under the fixed deficit rule, this growth rate slightly falls in the 
medium run while maintaining the same value in the long run. According to Poterba 
(1996), budget rules may provide a mechanism for constraining the discretion of 
politicians when they would prefer a larger budget deficit in the current period than 
they would have agreed to in a previous period. The anti-deficit tight rules 
accompanied with limits on government borrowing induce smaller deficits and more 
rapid adjustment of taxes and spending to unexpected fiscal shortfalls. Concerning 
the effect size, Heinemann et al. (2018) state that deficit rules on average reduce the 
primary deficit between 1.5% and 1.2% of GDP.  
Dur et al. (2000) analyzed the effects of fiscal rules on public investments if budget 
deficits are politically motivated. Policy-makers behave “fiscally irresponsibly” 
when public debt can be used by the party in office to influence the next period of 
policy-making. When parties has sharply different preferences, the one in office has 
an incentive to accumulate debt and spend more on its preferred public goods at the 
expense of future public consumption. Policy-makers have a tendency of running 
up budget deficits for strategic purposes that yield socially sub-optimal outcomes. 
However, political parties would unanimously agree on binding debt rules, some 
level of budget deficit that prevents strategic use of public debt. In this respect, 
Kosovo has been taken few measures to limit the “fiscally irresponsible” behavior 
of policy-makers. Thus, following wage and salary bill increases during the election 
process at the end of 2010, the budget law for 2011 contained specific provisions 
saying that “no transfer of any Budgetary appropriation may be made into the 
Expenditure Category of Wages and Salaries from another economic category 
without the prior approval of the Assembly.”1 Along with this, a provision has been 
included not allowing any employee to be paid through the goods and services 
category, which was a very common practice. The wage and salary bill again 
showed to be politically the most influenced budget category and that’s why (and 
based on IMF Staff recommendation for introduction of a rules-based framework to 
                                                             
1 Article 14.4 of law no.04/L-001 on budget of Republic of Kosovo for year 2011, dated 31 March 
2011. 
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guide public wage decisions) an amendment has been made to the law for 
management and accountability of public finances that limits wage increase beyond 
nominal GDP growth rate1. There has been also efforts to “discipline” the capital 
investments, in particular large infrastructure projects, from being (ab)used by the 
party in office for election purposes. For instance, to prevent the government from 
running budget deficits and thus creating future liabilities, the budget law for 2013 
included a provision saying that “funds for construction of Highway 6 will be 
allocated when the bank balance achieves the level of three hundred million 
(300,000,000) Euros.”2 However, this provision was not included in the law on 
budget for 2014, and the contract on Highway 6 (in the amount of 600 million euros, 
equal to 11% of the GDP) was signed shortly after the national elections of 2014. 
Within the law for management and accountability of public finances in July 2013, 
for the first time, a fiscal rule has been adopted limiting the budget deficit to 2% of 
GDP3 applicable as of the 2014 budget. This deficit rule was further clarified and 
advanced at the end of 2015.  
 
3. Budget Review 
Kosovo’s budget is run on a cash basis, as a traditional form of government 
accounting. (Irwing, 2015) As mentioned, till July 2013 there was no legal 
restriction on budget deficits. Yet, there was no legal clarification of what budget 
deficit means and how it should be measured. Thus, the government’s fiscal stance 
was followed based only on the cash balance (the difference between total receipts 
and total outlays), and it was publicly accepted as a budget deficit/surplus. As 
pointed out in the literature review, this principle does not give a real picture of 
public finance performance but is crucial for the government’s liquidity.  
Table 3 shows that both outlays and receipts experienced a real boom following 
independence (in particular, the capital investments). In spite of year by year 
improvements of taxes and fees and other non-tax revenues, total payments 
permanently exceeded total receipts. In this sense, the crucial problem seems to be 
overestimation of revenue capacity or overly optimistic revenue assumptions. 
Maintaining high budgetary payments was possible because of high initial cash 
balances and some of the “other revenue” items (dividends from public companies 
                                                             
1 Law no. 05/L-063 dated 14.12.2015 on amending and supplementing law no. 03/L-048 on public 
financial management and accountability amended and supplemented by laws no. 03/L-221, no. 04/L-
116 and 04/L-194. 
2 Article 20 of law no.04/L-165 on the budget of Republic of Kosovo for year 2013, dated 13 December 
2012. 
3 Law 04/L-194 on amending the law on management and accountability of public finances no. 03/L-
048 provides that “no law on budget allocations shall include a total deficit that exceeds the level of 
2% of forecasted GDP” (article 22.1.A), 12 July 2013. This law was applicable when the 2014 budget 
was being adopted. 
ISSN: 2065-0175                                                                                              ŒCONOMICA 
277 
and proceeds from privatization being the main portion). When these “other 
revenue” items ended, the financing gap had to be closed by internal borrowing. 
To analyze the causes of the budget deficits that led to public debt, we will start with 
the annual financial reports on Kosovo's consolidated budget. The reports, based on 
cash accounting, represent receipts and outlays and cash balance at the end year. 
However, during the period 2008-2016, there was no consistent form of reporting, 
particularly within receipts. Until 2013, no distinction was made between taxes, 
custom duties, or fees, and all of these were simply recorded as taxes. Furthermore, 
“own source revenues,” grants and aids, borrowings, deposit funds, fines, tariffs, 
royalties, interests, one-time privatization proceeds and other receipts were 
separately recorded. During 2014-2016, the item “taxes” was split into direct taxes, 
indirect taxes and non-tax revenues. The item “other receipts” has gathered the rest 
of the receipts while separate recordings of grants and aids and borrowing 
continued. Within outlays, there are four main categories: wages and salaries, goods 
and services and utilities, social transfers and subsidies and capital investments. The 
debt service, lending to public companies and other outlays are also separately 
recorded. The difference between total receipts and total outlays is reflected in the 
cash balance. Following adoption of the fixed deficit rule (2% of GDP) in July 2013, 
the budget deficit started for the first time to be reported only for fiscal year 2014 
and on. Considering the fixed deficit rule of 2% of GDP to be too tight, and to make 
room for more capital investments, a new fiscal rule that excludes from the primary 
deficit both spending of the privatization agency and spending from own source 
revenues carried forward was adopted by the end of 2015 within the amendments 
of the law on management and accountability of public finances.1 
Following Blejer and Cheasty’s (1991) reasoning on special-purpose deficits, we 
will calculate an alternative measure of the budget deficit. For this purpose we will 
“revise” both receipts and outlays and define budget deficit as a difference between 
total “regular” receipts and outlays. “Regular” will mean receipts and outlays that 
are permanent, non-discretionary, with no significant variation from year to year, 
and on which relies fiscal policy. Regular receipts exclude borrowings, grants and 
aids and one-time receipts such as privatization proceeds and dividends from public 
companies. The simple reason for excluding these receipts from the regular one is 
that they do not meet the criteria mentioned above: they are discretionary financing, 
can vary significantly from year to year and usually are one-time receipts and their 
inclusion as regular revenue leads to inappropriate confidence in their permanence 
and the sustainability of the government’s policy stance. As happened in Kosovo, 
they had to be replaced by government borrowing at a certain point. In the same 
way, regular outlays will not include lending to public companies (the dividend is 
                                                             
1 Law 05/L-063 on amending the Law on management and accountability of public finances no. 03/L-
048 amended with the laws no. 03/L-221, no. 04/L-116 and no 04/L-194 dated 14 December 2015. 
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also excluded from regular receipts) because they also do not meet the “regular” 
criteria, nor they are operational budget expenditures. In our analysis we will include 
“net dividend” as an “irregular” receipt that is measured as gross dividend received 
minus lending to public companies plus repayment of loans. Normally, the 
expenditures financed by borrowings will not be included in the outlays. Thus, after 
revising total receipts and outlays, we will arrive at the “regular” budget deficit as a 
special-purpose deficit. 
3.1. Budget Receipts 
To follow fiscal developments that resulted in high budget deficits, the total receipts 
will be revised and grouped in two categories: 1) “regular” receipts such as taxation 
(collected from customs and tax administration) and own source revenues (collected 
from municipalities and central government) and 2) “irregular” receipts such as 
grants and aids, dividends from public companies, capital receipts (privatization 
fund) and other receipts, excluding public borrowing.  
Table 4 and Chart 2 show remarkable increases of the “regular” receipts (tax and 
own source revenues) during the period, thus confirming the consolidation of both 
fiscal agencies (tax and custom administrations) as also pointed out by Koszan 
(2015). No single year shows a declining trend. The main increases were recorded 
during 2009-2011 (post-independence) and during 2014-2016, which is 
characterized mainly by fiscal consolidation measures (increasing the VAT standard 
rate from 16% to 18% and introduction of new reduced rate of 8%). Prudent fiscal 
policy recommends that all budgetary outlays should be projected based on these 
revenues. 
The category of “irregular” receipts recorded high fluctuations. Its main components 
were “one-time” receipts such as dividends from public companies and privatization 
proceeds. It is not their one-time character that raises concern for the budget, but 
rather (ab)use by the government that creates long-run liabilities. As Koszan (2015) 
points out, these cyclical revenues and one-off receipts from privatization increased 
the appetite for spending, especially in the run-ups to elections, thus resulting in 
surging government expenditures, particularly on public wages and pensions and 
ambitious infrastructure projects, as was the case in Kosovo. The highest level of 
“irregular” receipts was reached in 2009 and amounted to 219.3 million euros 
(included the dividend from Kosovo Telecom in the amount of 200 million euros)  
or 19.3% of total receipts for that year. The “irregular” receipts almost completely 
ceased in 2016, amounting to only 15.9 million euros or 1.7% of total receipts for 
that year. In total, during the period 2008-2016, dividend receipts amounted to 463.8 
million euros,1 while privatization proceeds amounted to 116.5 million euros. Thus, 
                                                             
1 During the same period, the government loaned Kosovo Energy Company the amount of 192.54 
million euros, of which the company repaid only 18.71 million euros. 
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financing expenditures based on unrealistic revenues could be continued only by 
relying on internal public debt. 
Table 4. Regular and irregular receipts (millions of EUR) and their ratios (%) 
 
Source: Recalculated data based on Budget Annual Financial Reports 
 
Chart 2. Regular and irregular receipts 
3.2. Budget Outlays 
In general, the budget deficits in Kosovo are consequences of continuous 
discretionary increases of outlays that could not be met by receipts. To determine 
the impact of different outlay categories on the budget deficit, we will briefly 
analyze behavior of each separately as shown in Table 5 and Chart 3 for the period 
2008-2016. It is obvious that goods and services was the only category with stable 
and permanent increases (139%). However, they had to be slightly cut (for 5%) 
during 2014-2016 due to increases of the wage and salary bill and social transfers. 
On the other hand, capital investment, which is much needed due to poor public 
infrastructure in Kosovo, wages and salaries and social transfers and subsidies 
showed high variations that could only be explained by political budget cycles. 
Thus, large capital investments and politically motivated increases in the wage and 
salary bill and social transfer are considered main causes of lasting budget deficits.1  
                                                             
1 IMF Staff Report 2015 Article Consultation drew attention to the worsened composition of the 
budget. 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Regular receipts 718   892   928   941   1.030 1.218 1.241 1.247 1.337 1.450 1.608 
Irregular receipts 19,6  23,0  60,9  219,3 142,1 89,8   142,9 114,6 12,1   91,1   15,9   
Regular receipts (%) 96,5  96,2  93,0  80,7   87,6   93,0   89,5   91,3   98,8   94,6   98,3   
Irregular receipts (%) 3,5    3,8    7,0    19,3   12,4   7,0    10,5   8,7    1,2    5,4    1,7    
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Table 5. Budget outlays (millions of EUR) 
 
Source: Budget Annual Financial Reports, Ministry of Finance of Kosovo 
 
Chart 3. Budget outlays 
Wages and salaries almost tripled during the period (261%). Although we do not 
disagree about the need to increase the low average salary, two cases show typical 
political behavior of these expenditures. In both cases, wages and salaries were 
increased just before or following national elections. The 2011 wage and salary bill 
increased by about 24% after the national elections of December 2010. The second 
one occurred in 2014, when the wage and salary bill was higher by 16% (IMF, 2015) 
than in 2013 running up to and following national elections in June 2014.1  
Subsides and transfers more than tripled during the period (310%). The composition 
of social spending has significantly changed, with pension and social assistance 
increasing in relative size. Only 7% of benefits are allocated based on economic 
welfare. Almost two-thirds of benefits are for age, health-care, and family benefits, 
while close to 30% are for war-related benefits (IMF, 2018). Table 5 shows the main 
increase (152%) was recorded during 2014-2016 as a consequence of reviews of 
social schemes and war benefits.  
                                                             
1 To avoid these “political” increases of wage and salaries (and based on IMF staff recommendations 
for introduction of a rules-based framework to guide public wage decisions), an amendment has been 
made to the law on public financial management and accountability that limits wage increases beyond 
nominal GDP growth rate (law no. 05/L-063 dated 14.12.2015 on amending and supplementing law 
no. 03/L-048 on public financial management and accountability amended and supplemented by laws 
no. 03/L-221, no. 04/L-116 and 04/L-194).  
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Wages and salaries 203,8 208,5 227,1 264,4 311,4 385,0 407,7 417,1 485,2 525,0 543,7 
Goods and services 143,0 144,9 158,1 171,0 182,2 176,9 190,9 215,5 205,0 205,5 202,1 
Subsidies and transfers 155,4 153,0 209,8 256,9 252,7 256,2 280,1 312,9 361,2 418,1 474,7 
Capital investments 133,2 154,8 347,1 400,4 455,3 528,2 550,2 529,2 411,4 403,9 443,6 
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Capital investments are much needed for economic development of the country. 
Public investment induces an increase in the rate of return to private capital and 
thereby stimulates private investment expenditure. (Aschauser, 1989) Thus, 
following independence in 2008, the government engaged in a very ambitious 
program of capital investment that focused mainly on road infrastructure 
(construction of two new motorways, Routes 6 and 7). Capital investments more 
than doubled in the first year of independence and continued substantially to 
increase (14-16% per year) for several years, reaching the highest level in 2011-
2012 (11% of GDP). But the increasing trend was sharply stopped in 2014 as a 
consequence of high increases in the wage and salary bill and subsidies and social 
transfer. Capital investments were cut by about 30% even though the government 
had signed the contract for the new motorway (Route 6) from Prishtina to 
Macedonia. Its level was kept at about 7% of the GDP during 2014-2016 due to 
budgetary adjustments. Since then, capital investments were permanently below the 
level of wages and salaries and subsidies and social transfers, confirming worsening 
of the composition of the budget. Thus, one of the main drivers of economy growth 
was sacrificed to keep the budget deficit within the legally determined limit of 2% 
of the GDP. 
3.3. “Regular” Budget Deficits 
As mentioned, officially reported figures based on cash accounting do not tell the 
real fiscal status. The data in Table 4 show a gap of no concern between total receipts 
and total outlays. However, now the picture is different viewed from the point of 
“regular”1 receipts and outlays. Table 6 and Chart 4 show regular receipts could not 
meet regular outlays in any year from 2008-2016. They were permanently below 
the outlay level even though their increase was high and continuous (180%). But 
regular outlays grew much more (249%). It is obvious that the government has been 
running permanent and growing “regular” deficits since independence. In particular, 
the regular primary deficits were high for five consecutive years (2009-2013), 
keeping the level almost constantly above 4% of GDP, except in 2011. The primary 
budget deficit reached its highest level in 2013, amounting to 239.1 million euros 
or 4.7% of GDP. At the end of 2016, the total accumulated deficit amounted to 1.282 
billion euros, about 40% of which was financed through internal borrowing. There 
was no single year with a budget surplus, and fiscal adjustments started only in 2014 
after the deficit rule was adopted in mid-2013.  
                                                             
1 “Regular” as being revised according to the criteria set above.  
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Table 6. Regular budget deficit (millions of EUR) 
 
Source: Recalculated data based on Budget Annual Financial Reports 
 
Chart 4. Regular budget deficits 
 
4. Financing of “Regular” Budget Deficit 
Internal borrowing, as the only financing solution for the government, started in 
2012, i.e., in the fifth year of independence following serious liquidity difficulties 
(in 2012, along with the first internal debt, a second installment disbursed from IMF 
in the amount of 93.64 million euros helped stabilize cash balances). Table 7 and 
chart 5 show that public debt is directly a consequence of falling cash balances (the 
lowest level since 2007) and high regular budget deficits (the cumulative budget 
deficit at year end 2011 was 515.2 million euros). Due to high and politically 
motivated expenditures in wages and salaries and social transfers, the budget deficit 
persisted, although at a lower scale. This high level of regular outlays was mainly 
based on “irregular” receipts. Thus, continuously decreased “irregular” receipts had 
to be replaced with public debt if outlays were to be kept on a high level. As a logical 
consequence, the lower budget deficit was accompanied by higher public debt.  
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Regular receipts 718   892   928   941   1.030 1.218 1.241 1.247 1.337 1.450 1.608 
Regular outlays 657   673   953   1.107 1.216 1.358 1.438 1.486 1.476 1.569 1.678 
Regular Primary deficit 61,2  218,4 24,5-   165,7- 185,3- 139,7- 197,7- 239,1- 139,3- 119,9- 70,5-   
Interest -   -    -    0,74   9,00   8,78   10,08 11,48 12,46 17,33 19,21 
Regular Deficit 61,2  218,4 24,5-   166,4- 194,3- 148,5- 207,8- 250,6- 151,8- 137,3- 89,7-   
Pr.Def. to GDP ratio (%) 0,71-   4,27-   4,55-   3,17-   4,11-   4,73-   2,62-   2,15-   1,21-   
Nominal GDP 3.461 3.883 4.070 4.402 4.815 5.059 5.327 5.567 5.807 5.985 
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Table 7. Financing of regular primary deficit (millions of EUR) 
 
Source: Budget Annual Financial Reports and recalculated primary deficit 
 
Chart 5. Financing of regular primary deficit 
In total, during the period 2008-2016, the regular primary budget deficit reached 
about 1.282 billion euros. The financing of this regular primary budget deficit was 
made through internal public debt in the amount of 479 million euros, external 
public debt (IMF) in the amount of 187 million euros, public company net dividends 
in the amount of 290 million euros, privatization proceeds in the amount of 117 
million euros, reduction of cash balance in the amount of 179 million euros and 
from dedicated and non-categorized revenues in the amount of 30 million euros. 
None of these items, excluding public debt, is regular: not permanent, vary 
significantly year after year and are one-time receipts. At the same time, since a 
significant part (37.4%) of deficit is financed by internal public debt, it is likely to 
be growth-inhibiting. (Adam & Bevan, 2005) 
 
5. Conclusion  
The government of the independent Kosovo started with ample cash balances and 
small budget surpluses based on cash accounting reporting. However, badly needed 
capital investment forced the government to engage in very ambitious capital 
projects (mainly road infrastructure) based on overly optimistic revenue estimation 
mainly in the category of “irregular” receipts (dividends from public companies and 
privatization proceeds). Although the budget deficit initially was caused by large 
capital investments, it was worsened by “politically” motivated increases of the 
wage and salary bill and social transfers and subsidies. This was supported by lack 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Primary deficit 61,2   218,4 24,5-   165,7- 185,3- 139,7- 197,7- 239,1- 139,3- 119,9- 70,5-   
Debt issues 73,3   79,2   104,0 121,3 101,2 
Cash Balance 211,0 449,8 475,5 383,9 290,8 203,6 278,2 211,8 163,5 256,5 271,2 
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of legal infrastructure that limits budget deficits and public debt. Thus, for several 
years, the government ran up budget deficits that were underestimated and not 
known to the public. Faced with liquidity issues as a result of falling cash balances, 
the government resorted to internal public borrowing as the only choice. Internal 
public debt grew constantly, but no principal debt has been serviced—only interest 
has been paid thus far. To ease the debt burden, the government is extending its 
maturity gradually by replacing short-term treasury bills with long-term treasury 
bills and bonds.  
As a recommendation, governments should engage in large capital projects only 
after having secured financing sources based on “regular” revenues and/or 
borrowings. The “irregular” budgetary items should be considered temporary 
sources regardless of their size, and governments should refrain from creating long-
term liabilities based on their doubtful permanence. To avoid “politically” 
motivated budget deficits, there should be clear legal rules that limit the 
government’s use for electoral purposes of public resources while in office by 
increasing budget deficits, public debt and nominal wage and salary bills and social 
transfers.  
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